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NOTES
Bankruptcy: Good Faith and the
Zero Payment Plan in Chapter 13*
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 13 of the new Bankruptcy Code' was intended to
simplify and to extend the relief previously available to debt-
ors through the under-utilized "wage earner" provisions of
Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act.2 Under Chapter 13, a
debtor with regular incomes files a plan4 with the court for
paying both his secured and unsecured creditors.5 If the court
accepts the debtor's proposal and confirms it, the debtor's
creditors are required to accept the proposed payments.6 The
debtor's obligations, with a few exceptions, are discharged
* The author gratefully acknowledges the time and interest contributed by
Judge Joe Lee, Bankruptcy Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, in critiquing this Note.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (Supp. 1I 1979) (originally enacted on Nov. 6, 1978 as
Tit. II, ch. 13, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549-688). The Bankruptcy Code became
effective on Oct. 1, 1979.
2 Address by Hon. Conrad K. Cyr, Seminar on Bankruptcy Law held at the Uni-
versity of Kentucky (Aug. 24-25, 1979), reprinted in Report of Seminar [on] Bank-
ruptcy Law (New), Office of Continuing Legal Education, University of Kentucky
College of Law (1980). As observed by Judge Cyr.
Until 1951, 84% of all Chapter XIm cases filed-and the total was less than
10,000 a year-were filed in one district, the Northern District of Alabama.
While that spottiness did not continue into the 70's, it remains the fact that
in many districts Chapter XIII is seldom used.
Id. at 81 (citing unnamed Senate Judiciary Committee report).
3 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (Supp. I1 1979) defines an "individual with regular in-
come" as an "individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such
individual to make payments under a plan under Chapter 13 of this title, other than a
stock broker or a commodity broker." Id.
4 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. 1I 1979).
5 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (Supp. III 1979). For an authoritative overview of the opera-
tion of Chapter 13, see Lee, Chapter 13 nee Chapter XIII, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303
(1979). A handy practical analysis of Chapter 13 and the Bankruptcy Code from the
perspective of creditors' counsel is also available in W. MAPOTHER, CREDITORS AND
THE NEW BANKRUPTCY CODE (2d ed. 1980).
6 11 U.S.C. § 1327 (Supp. m1 1979).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69
once the payments are completed.7
The bread and butter issue in Chapter 13 is the amount
which unsecured creditors must receive in order for a plan to
gain court acceptance. Generally, secured creditors are enti-
tled to receive the value of their collateral,8 while unsecured
creditors 9 often find themselves at the mercy of the court and
the debtor in their efforts to collect even a few cents on the
dollar. This situation occurs because debtors may propose
plans that provide for little or no payment to unsecured credi-
tors. Enhancing the possibility of zero or nominal payment to
unsecured creditors is the fact that the only express amount
requirement in Chapter 1310 is that unsecured creditors re-
7 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (Supp. III 1979).
8 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1979). This will not necessarily hold true if the security
interest is in property exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). Note, however, that a Chap-
ter 13 plan cannot modify a secured claimant's rights if the collateral is real property
that is the debtor's principal residence. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
9 Unsecured creditors are of two kinds: those who had no security interest to
begin with and those who are "undersecured." Undersecured creditors are unsecured
to the extent that their claims exceed the allowed value of their collateral. 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a) (1979).
10 This requirement is contained in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a), appearing below, which
also contains the good faith requirement:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan if-
(1) the plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with other
applicable provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or
by the plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is
not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of
the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan-
(A)the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i)the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain
the lien securing such claim; and
(ii)the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of
property to be distributed under the plan on account of such
claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; or
(C)the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to
such holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to
comply with the plan.
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ceive not less than the amount they would be paid if the
debtor's estate were liquidated under Chapter 7. Many courts,
unwilling to accept such results, have interpreted the good
faith requirement of 11 U.S.C. section 1325(a)(3)11 to demand
that debtors wishing to take advantage of the liberal discharge
provisions of Chapter 1312 demonstrate a willingness to pay
their unsecured creditors more than a zero or nominal
amount.
The controversy over the meaning and application of the
good faith requirement in 11 U.S.C. section 1325(a)(3) reflects
a philosophical split among the courts; some courts believe
Congress did not intend that the advantages of Chapter 13
should be enjoyed by debtors unless earned by some addi-
tional effort on their part, while other courts think that Con-
gress intended to liberalize the "fresh start" opportunities of
the Bankruptcy Code to the point of allowing debtors to com-
pletely unburden themselves of their unsecured debts.13 On a
moral level, this split may stem from different views of the
nature of consumer debtors. On a purely administrative level,
it may also reflect a difference in attitude between bankruptcy
judges resigned to a case-by-case examination of the social
and economic facts involved and those judges who, in the in-
terests of judicial efficiency, are willing to apply the statute
more mechanically in order to deal with crowded dockets.
1 4
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (Supp. II 1979) (emphasis added).
:I Id.
'2 Among other advantages, a debtor may discharge debts under Chapter 13 that
would be nondischargeable under Chapter 7, such as debts incurred by fraud. Lee,
supra note 5, at 307 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)). As a result, Chapter 13 may cause a
creditor who possesses a nondischargeable debt to ultimately receive less under Chap-
ter 13 than he would receive under Chapter 7, in spite of the congressional intent
reflected in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). This result obtains from the fact that the 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) limitation is based only upon what a creditor would be paid under
a Chapter 7 liquidation today.
13 See generally Comment, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 29 CATH. U. L. REv. 843 (1980).
" Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-For-Law-
yers Bill (pt. II), 1979 UTAH L. REv. 175, 175 n.2 (1979), cites government statistics to
the effect that 172,423 consumer bankruptcies were filed in fiscal year 1978. In this
regard, see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6077, which notes that "the number of bankruptcies has
risen over 2,000 percent in the past 30 years."
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This Note will examine good faith in Chapter 13 as it re-
lates to the amount of payments to unsecured creditors that
courts require before confirming a proposed plan. First, the
principal arguments in support of the view that good faith re-
quires more than a zero or nominal payment plan will be ex-
amined. The focus will then shift to the countervailing argu-
ments, i.e., that zero or nominal payment plans are
compatible with the good faith requirement of 11 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1325(a)(3). Trends in case law since October 1, 1979, the
effective date of the Bankruptcy Code, will next be analyzed
to discover what courts are accomplishing in line with, or in
spite of, statutory construction and legislative history. Finally,
this Note will discuss the trends and likely outcome of this
issue for practitioners and petitioners in Kentucky.
I. GOOD FAITH-A THRESHOLD DEFINITION
Good faith is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. As a
result, courts seeking guidance on this matter have tried sev-
eral approaches, often applying principles of statutory con-
struction and examining legislative history. Another popular
approach has been to lift the definition of good faith that Col-
lier on Bankruptcy applied to the old Bankruptcy Act15 and
to transplant it into the Code.16 Under this flexible analysis,
good faith is deemed absent only when there has been an
"abuse of the provisions, purpose or spirit" of Chapter 13.17
Even when Collier is not cited, this concept of good faith is
controlling in the majority of cases on the issue."
Judicial definitions of good faith in the abstract, however,
Fraud, improper scheduling, payment or promises to pay money to pro-
cure acceptances are instances of lack of good faith as well as acts barred by
the statute. Good faith itself is not defined but generally the inquiry is di-
rected to whether or not there has been an abuse of the provisions, purpose,
or spirit of Chapter XIII in the proposal or plan.
10 W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 29.06[6] (14th ed. 1978).
,6 E.g., In re Harland, 3 B.R. 597 (D. Neb. 1980); In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551 (W.D.
Mich. 1980); In re Beaver, 2 B.R. 337 (S.D. Cal. 1980).
'7 10 W. COLLIER, supra note 15, 29.06[6].
" For example, In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256 (D. Utah 1980), the leading case for
the proposition that good faith requires more than zero or nominal payment, while
never directly referring to Collier, arrives at a definition perfectly compatible with
that contained in note 15, supra.
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are far less important than the application of the chosen defi-
nition to the confirmation of a zero or nominal payment plan
proposed under Chapter 13. In Chapter 13 cases, one is likely
to encounter good faith in at least three separate contexts.
First, courts may examine good faith as it relates to a debtor's
motive for filing a plan. This is particularly true where the
court has reason to suspect that an effort is underway to delay
or defraud creditors.1' Second, courts have spoken of good
faith when discussing the classification of claims under 11
U.S.C. section 1322,20 although the preferred statutory word-
ing in that context would appear to be "fair" or "unfair."
21
Neither of these "good faith" issues is central here. The "good
faith" that shall be examined in the following pages is its use
as a rubric for the acceptability or nonacceptability of zero or
nominal payment plans. It is in this context that a good faith
issue most frequently arises under Chapter 13.2
II. GOOD FAITH AND REJECTION OF THE ZERO PAYMENT PLAN
In re Iacovoni,23 an early case under the Bankruptcy
Code, marshalled many of the arguments against zero pay-
ment plans and rejected such plans based upon a lack of good
faith. The primary arguments advanced by the Iacovoni court
had their genesis in principles of statutory construction, in
legislative history, and in administrative necessity. Subse-
11 E.g., In re Seely, 6 B.R. 309 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Bums, 6 B.R. 286 (D. Colo.
1980); In re Goeb, 4 B.R. 735 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551 (W.D. Mich.
1980); In re Ryals, 3 B.R. 522 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
20 In re Kovich, 4 B.R. 403 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
21 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (Supp. I1 1979) states that "the plan ... may not
discriminate unfairly against any class so designated."
2 In this regard courts have employed good faith as a method of assessing the
amount of the payment, i.e., whether it is "substantial" or "meaningful," and also as
a method of assessing whether there need be any payment at all. Cases involving the
former usage include In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346 (S.D. W. Va. 1980); In re Beaver, 2 B.R.
337 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2 B.R. 256 (D. Utah 1980). One case involving the
latter usage is In re Chaffin, 4 B.R. 324 (D. Kan. 1980). Contra, In re Kovich, 4 B.R.
403 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
- 2 B.R. 256 (D. Utah 1980). The facts of this case cannot themselves be consid-
ered determinative since this case is a consolidation of eight separate petitions, in
each of which the debtor proposed to pay nothing to unsecured creditors. The credi-
tors would have received nothing had the petitions been filed under Chapter 7.
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quently, other courts have discovered additional reasons for
rejecting zero payment plans on the basis of 11 U.S.C. section
1325(a)(3). The discussion that follows will touch on each of
these arguments and will also examine the ultimate question
of how much payment is enough under Chapter 13.
A. The Iacovoni Doctrine
1. Statutory Construction
In re Iacovoni24 offers several arguments in support of the
proposition that zero or nominal payment plans cannot be ac-
cepted as being in good faith. The first of these arguments is
based upon the eligibility requirement of Chapter 13, i.e., that
the debtor must be "an individual with regular income."2 The
Code defines "individual with regular income" as an "individ-
ual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable
such individual to make payments under a plan under chapter
13 of this title."26 The Iacovoni court found this to be a clear
indication that Congress intended that the debtor use future
income to make payments under the plan. If by offering a zero
payment plan the debtor could avoid making any payments at
all, the requirement of regular income would be rendered arbi-
trary.2 7 In a similar vein, the feasibility requirement of 11
U.S.C. section 1325(a)(6) that "the debtor will be able to
make all payments under the plan" was cited by the court as
an indication of congressional intent that payments would be
made under the plan. 8
The potential weakness of both arguments posed in the
preceding paragraph is that the word "payments" in the stat-
utes could refer to payments to secured parties as well as to
unsecured parties. Were this the proper interpretation, a plan
that proposed zero payments to unsecured creditors yet pro-
vided for payments to secured creditors would satisfy the
wording of both 11 U.S.C. section 109(e) and 11 U.S.C. section
24 Id.
22 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (Supp. III 1979).
26 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (Supp. III 1979).
27 2 B.R. at 262.
28 Id.
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1325(a)(6). Supporting the "regular earnings" argument, how-
ever, is the fact that secured claims are valued at the worth of
the collateral on the date of filing the petition. Therefore, un-
less payment of unsecured creditors was intended by Con-
gress, the debtor could simply surrender the collateral or sell
it and pay off his secured creditors from the proceeds, 9
thereby never having to touch his "regular earnings."30 In a
related argument, the lacovoni court noted that secured credi-
tors "receive similar protection under [either] Chapter 7 or
Chapter 13."3' It would make no sense, the court reasoned, to
provide debtors with additional incentives to file under Chap-
ter 13 unless an additional dividend to creditors was also an-
ticipated. Since no additional dividend to secured creditors
was made available, the court concluded that Congress in-
tended the extra creditor benefit of Chapter 13 to fall to un-
secured creditors by way of requiring some payment.32
Two additional statutory construction arguments appear
in Iacovoni, both grounded in the hardship discharge provi-
sions of the Code. Section 1328(b) empowers the court to
grant the debtor a hardship discharge if, due to circumstances
beyond the debtor's control, he or she is unable to complete
payments under the plan. 3 In Iacovoni the court pointed out
that this hardship discharge provision would have no purpose
if a Chapter 13 debtor could propose a no-payment plan, since
the debtor could then never fail to make the payments. 4 This
29 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (Supp. 1I 1979).
20 It is conceivable, of course, that debtors filing under Chapter 13 would have no
secured creditors at all. In these situations the word "payments" would appear to
require some payment to unsecured creditors. It may well be that such situations
were simply outside the immediate contemplation of the drafters of 11 U.S.C. §
109(e) and 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).
21 2 B.R. at 264.
32 Id. Contra, In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584, 586 (D. Colo. 1980) (Iacovoni mistaken;
treatment of secured creditors under Chapter 13 "vastly different" from Chapter 7).
33 At any time after the confirmation of the plan and after notice and a
hearing, the court may grant a discharge to a debtor who has not completed
payments under the plan only if-
(1)the debtor's failure to complete such payments is due to cir-
cumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held
accountable.
11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (Supp. III 1979).
24 2 B.R. at 262. Recognizing this fact but refusing to be troubled by it, the court
1980-81]
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argument is undercut somewhat by the fact that while 11
U.S.C. section 1328(b) is unnecessary for zero payment plans,
it may nonetheless remain critical for those debtors who vol-
untarily propose plans paying more.
A separate and more persuasive argument based upon the
hardship discharge provision turns on the fact that debts that
are nondischargeable in Chapter 7 are also nondischargeable
under 11 U.S.C. section 1328(c).3 5 These same debts are dis-
chargeable under Chapter 13 generally, however, if and when
the debtor completes his or her plan.36 Because of this, the
debtor who tries to make some repayment to his unsecured
creditors on debts that are otherwise nondischargeable under
Chapter 7, and fails through no fault of his own, receives a far
less generous discharge than does the debtor who refuses to
attempt any repayment in the first place. This glaring ineq-
uity has caused several courts to refuse to confirm zero pay-
ment plans on the basis that they were lacking in good faith.
Since bankruptcy courts are essentially equitable in nature,38
the premium that this approach places on the debtor's atti-
tude is neither improper nor surprising.39
in In re Koerperich, 5 B.R. 752 (D. Neb. 1980), upheld a zero payment plan with the
observation that: "A debtor who files a zero-payment plan has completed the 'pay-
ments under the plan' and is accordingly eligible for discharge. Id. at 757 (em-
phasis added).
35 "A discharge granted under subsection (b)... discharges the debtor from all
unsecured debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title,
except any debt. . . of a kind specified in section 523(a) of this title." 11 U.S.C. §
1328(c) (Supp. III 1979). See note 33 supra for the text of subsection (b), the hard-
ship discharge provision. Section 523(a) exempts certain claims from discharge under
Chapter 7.
36 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (Supp. III 1979).
17 For a particularly concise analysis of this position, see In re Campbell, 3 B.R.
57, 59 (S.D. Cal. 1980).
-" "Bankruptcy courts are traditionally courts of equity ... " In re Am. Lum-
ber Co., 5 B.R. 470, 478 (D. Minn. 1980).
" In refusing to confirm a zero payment plan, the court in In re Cook, 3 B.R. 480
(S.D. W. Va. 1980), analyzed the issue of the debtor's attitude in the following
manner:
[L]et me be not too subtle in suggesting that the process progresses toward
answering the question "how much can I pay?" rather than starting out
trying to determine "how little can I get by with paying?". . . It may be
that a debtor whose preoccupation is determining the least the Court will
accept, is approaching Chapter 13 relief from the wrong direction.
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2. Legislative History
Legislative history is extensively cited in lacovoni to sup-
port the notion that Congress intended to forbid the confir-
mation of zero or nominal payment plans under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.4 0  The court's authority for enforcing this
perceived intent is the good faith requirement of Chapter 13.41
Certain comments excerpted from the House and Senate Re-
ports on the Bankruptcy Code are particularly convincing in
this regard. The House Report expressed dissatisfaction with
Chapter XIH of the Bankruptcy Act and explained the con-
gressional purpose in passing Chapter 13 in the following
manner:
[A]n overly stringent and formalized chapter XIII... has
discouraged overextended debtors from attempting to ar-
range a repayment plan under which all creditors are repaid
most, if not all, of their claims over an extended period. The
hearings before the Subcommittee indicated strongly that
most consumer debtors would rather work out a repayment
plan than file straight bankruptcy.
42
Id. at 485-86.
41 2 B.R. at 263-67.
41 It can be deduced from the Commission Report, which recommended
the proposed legislation, that the "good faith" requirement was meant to be
given substance, particularly in light of the broader Chapter 13 discharge,
so as to protect the rights of unsecured creditors:
If the plan is "in the best interest of creditors" and has been proposed in
"good faith," the fact that the debtor may not be eligible for a discharge in
straight bankruptcy should not prevent confirmation of a plan of payment
from future earnings, and the Commission accordingly recommends omis-
sion of any such limitation.
In re lacovoni, 2 B.R. at 265-66 (citing EXEcUTIVE DIREcTOR, COMM'N ON THE BANK-
RUPTcY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 163
(1973)). The court goes on to conclude:
Thus, the "good faith" requirement carries a substantive content which af-
fects the effort and payments on unsecured claims required for confirma-
tion of a plan independent of the "best interest of creditors" test. Secured
creditors are, of course, provided for independent of the "good faith" and
"best interest of creditors" requirements by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) ....
2 B.R. at 266.
42 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 14. It is noteworthy that this indication that
debtors should attempt to pay all or most of their debts occurs on page 117 of the
House Report, immediately following this dismal recognition of the plight of the con-
1980-81]
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The Senate Report is equally sanguine about the repayment
prospects of creditors under Chapter 13 and contains one
comment which appears to expressly prohibit zero payment
plans:
The new chapter 13 will permit almost any individual with
regular income to propose and have approved a reasonable
plan for debt repayment based on that individual's exact
circumstances. 43 As in current law, 100 percent payment
plans will be encouraged by the limitation on availability of
a subsequent discharge in section 727(a)(8). This kind of
plan has provided great self-satisfaction and pride to those
debtors who complete them and at the same time effect a
maximum return to creditors. The limitation of § 727(a)(8)
... is also necessary to prevent chapter 13 plans from
turning into mere offers of composition plans under which
payments would equal only the non-exempt assets of the
debtor.
4 4
Courts following lacovoni have made extensive use of
sumer debtor on page 116:
The result of the increase in consumer credit has been a corresponding
increase in the number of consumers who have overburdened themselves
with debt. Often, these consumers are able to keep up with their obligations
in normal times, but have saved very little for emergencies or unexpected
events. When a family member takes seriously ill or when the breadwinner
is laid off from his job, a financial crisis ensues. In many cases, a young
family of two, both working, incur a large amount of debt. If the wife stops
working because of pregnancy, the family loses nearly half of its income,
and has an extra member to feed and shelter. The family vill go deeper and
deeper into debt to support themselves, until finally the roof falls in.
Id. at 6076-77. In further support of the contention that debtors were intended to
make some effort to repay their creditors, the House Report, on page 118, addresses
the benefits to both sides:
Chapter 13 also protects a debtor's credit standing far better than a
straight bankruptcy, because he is viewed by the credit industry as a better
risk. In addition, it satisfies many debtors' desire to avoid the stigma at-
tached to straight bankruptcy and to retain the pride attendant on being
able to meet one's obligations. The benefit to creditors is self-evident; their
losses will be significantly less than if their debtors opt for straight
bankruptcy.
Id. at 6079.
"3This passage would certainly appear to settle the question whether Congress
envisioned a case-by-case approach to debtors' plans under Chapter 13.
44 S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5787, 5799 (emphasis added).
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these and other similar statements from the legislative history
of the Bankruptcy Code.45 One of the more ambitious reviews
of legislative history appears in In re Hurd,'46 which tracks the
development of bankruptcy law in the United States from the
founding of the country and concludes with this observation:
[I]t would appear that the whole purpose and spirit of bank-
ruptcy has been twofold. Historically, the first purpose was
to take the debtors' assets, liquidate the same and distribute
them to the creditors. The second purpose was to grant a
discharge to the honest but unfortunate debtor and thus
give to him a fresh start. To the Constitutional Convention
and the People of the United States in the 18th century,
bankruptcy did not mean a social relief procedure for
debtors to be financed by their creditors without any possi-
ble advantage to the creditors except a mere pittance. In de-
termining the intent of Congress, this history must be
considered.
47
An additional argument advanced by the facovoni court
and anchored in the legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Code is based on the deletion from Chapter 13 of a provision
requiring creditor approval of the proposed plan.48 The court
felt this retraction would leave the Code "out of balance" un-
less the creditors' interests could be protected by requiring
some payment by the debtor.4' Considering the general thrust
of the Code's legislative history, this argument appears to
have considerable merit.
5 0
41 E.g., In re Hurd, 6 B.R. 329 (N.D. Ind. 1980); In re Hobday, 4 B.R. 417 (N.D.
Ohio 1980); In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551 (W.D. Mich. 1980); In re Montano, 4 B.R. 535
(D.D.C. 1980).
46 4 B.R. 551 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
47 Id. at 555.
48 Creditor approval was required under old Chapter XIII. Bankruptcy Act
§ 652, 52 Stat. 934, 11 U.S.C. § 1052 (1938) (repealed 1979). No such provision ap-
pears in the Bankruptcy Code.
4, For another example of "balancing" by this court, see notes 31 and 32 supra
and accompanying text.
80 In support of its contention, the Iacovoni court cites the House Debates for
the statement- "[I~f the debtor makes an effort to repay his creditors, the creditors
should not be able to say that the plan does not propose to pay enough or that it does
not do other things that the creditors want." 2 B.R. at 265 (citing H.R. DEBATES, 123
CONG. REC. H11,690-92, H11,696-710 IV-12 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977)) (emphasis
added). Considering this expression of legislative intent, it is argued that the court
1980-81]
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3. Administrative Convenience
The final argument advanced by the Iacovoni court was
based upon budgetary considerations, or "administrative ne-
cessity."51 Under Chapter 13, a private trustee"2 receives his
compensation for examining the debtor and advising the
court 53 by taking a percentage of the payments made to credi-
tors under the plan.5 Zero payment plans would deny these
trustees compensation and would threaten the workability of
the system.5 A debtor who takes advantage of the system by
fling under Chapter 13 and yet who undercuts it by proposing
a zero payment plan is therefore deemed to be acting in bad
faith.5 6
B. Post-lacovoni Arguments
In re Jacovoni does not exhaust the arguments against
zero or nominal payment plans under Chapter 13. The auto-
matic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. section 1301 are further evi-
dence that Congress intended to have debtors pay their un-
secured creditors under Chapter 13 plans.5 7 The automatic
stay against collection from co-debtors on consumer debts is
effective only to the extent that the principal debtor's Chap-
ter 13 plan proposes to pay these debts.58 This situation has
been viewed, perhaps properly, as encouraging repayment by
the principal debtor.59 There remains, however, the possibility
must assume the office of policing the debtor's effort. Accord, In re Beaver, 2 B.R. 337
(S.D. Cal. 1980).
51 2 B.R. at 268.
52 A "private" trustee is one who is not a salaried United States Trustee.
3 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (Supp. m 1979).
- 11 U.S.C. § 326(b) (Supp. III 1979).
85 This argument was branded "de minimus" in In re Terry, 3 B.R. 63 (W.D.
Ark.), rev'd on other grounds, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980). It was also employed by
the trustee in In re Harland, 3 B.R. 597 (D. Neb. 1980), which nonetheless confirmed
the debtor's zero payment plan.
2 B.R. at 268.
,7 The automatic stay provision is contained in 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (Supp. 1I 1979)
and works to prevent a creditor from asserting his claim against a co-debtor of a
bankrupt consumer.
11 U.S.C. § 1301(c)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
" The fact that the automatic stay against collection from co-debtors on
consumer debts is operative only to the extent the plan proposes to pay the
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that obdurate debtors will propose zero payment plans any-
way, thereby allowing the weight of their obligations to fall
upon their co-debtors. Furthermore, it is reasonable to as-
sume, particularly in regard to consumer debts, that many co-
debtors will be little better off than their principals. The con-
firmation of zero payment plans in such instances may have
the effect of increasing consumer bankruptcies as co-debtors
themselves turn to the courts for relief.10 Arguably, such an
attempt to shift the burden to a co-debtor would not comply
with the good faith requirement in Chapter 13.
Several courts have refused to confirm zero or nominal
payment plans involving debts that were nondischargeable
under Chapter 7.61 Although Chapter 13 does allow the dis-
charge of certain debts that are nondischargeable under Chap-
ter 7,62 these courts have contended that the use of Chapter
13 for the sole purpose of escaping these debts is not only in
claim will probably have the salutary effect of encouraging 100% payment
plans by debtors who are capable of carrying out such plans, and will limit
the use of composition plans to debtors who cannot pay in full and main-
tain a decent living standard for themselves and their families.
Lee, supra note 5, at 313.
,0 This possibility is strengthened by the fact that separate classification of un-
secured debts involving a co-debtor is not favored under Chapter 13:
It appears doubtful the courts will condone debtors placing debts on which
codebtors are obligated in a class separate and apart from other unsecured
debts for purposes of the plan. The Code permits unsecured debts to be
placed in a separate class on the basis of amount. . . . It also permits un-
secured claims on which the last payment is due after the date on which the
final payment under the plan is due to be dealt with separately. There is no
authorization for further classification of unsecured debts.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes deleted).
61 E.g., In re Patterson, 4 B.R. 239 (C.D. Cal. 1980); In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346 (S.D.
W. Va. 1980); In re Bloom, 3 B.R. 467 (C.D. Cal. 1980); In re Marlow, 3 B.R. 305
(N.D. Ill. 1980).
62 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (Supp. III 1979).
A third important advantage available under chapter 13 is that the
debtor can obtain release from nondischargeable, unsecured debts, other
than claims entitled to priority or for alimony or child maintenance, by par-
tial payment of claims under a composition plan. A nondischargeable debt,
such as a debt for embezzlement, for money obtained by fraud, for willful
and malicious injury to the person or property of another, for a fine or an
educational loan, can be compromised in the same manner as other un-
secured debts.
Lee, supra note 5, at 307 (footnotes deleted).
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bad faith, but is also an attempt to make the court a party to
the irresponsible, or even fraudulent, behavior of the debtor.6 3
Another point that may be used to reject zero payment
plans is the absence of a time limit for successive filings under
Chapter 13." A debtor may use Chapter 13 in successive
years, or conceivably in successive months, rather than ob-
serving either the six-year limit between Chapter 7 proceed-
ings 5 or the conditions placed upon filing for a Chapter 7
within six years of a prior Chapter 13.66 At least one court has
held that confirming a zero payment plan under Chapter 13
for debtors discharged within the preceding six years under
Chapter 7 would have the effect of allowing successive Chap-
ter 7 liquidations within six years, thereby violating congres-
sional intent and the spirit, if not the letter, of 11 U.S.C. sec-
tion 727(a)(8).67 Other courts, concerned that debtors accept
more responsibility for their obligations," have cited the pos-
sibility of the "repeater" debtor as another reason for with-
holding confirmation from zero or nominal payment plans as
63 It is obvious that debtors all over the country are seeking to use Chap-
ter 13 as a way of avoiding ... limitations upon a Chapter 7 discharge. In
cases where the debtor would be denied his discharge for some wrongful
conduct, or would be denied his discharge as a "repeater" debtor, or if there
is a substantial likelihood that one or more debts might be excepted from
the discharge under Chapter 7, the debtors are now proposing to evade
these limitations by making only an "illusory" payment to creditors. It is
my opinion that a bankruptcy case does not become a Chapter 13 case
merely by calling it a Chapter 13 case. If its real motive and purpose is to
obtain a discharge of the debts without a reasonable and substantial pay-
ment to the creditors, and if the true purpose of attaching the label of
"Chapter 13" to the case is to evade the discharge limitations in a Chapter
7 case, the court should recognize the case for what it is, an illusion. I there-
fore find that the illusory Chapter 13 plan is not in good faith.
In re Bloom, 3 B.R. 467, 471-72 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
""Under the new Bankruptcy Code it is quite conceivable that a debtor could
file a new Chapter 13 case every year, or for that matter even monthly. The Code
simply contains no time limitations upon an earlier discharge or earlier filing." Id. at
469.
65 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (Supp. III 1979).
" 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9) (Supp. 1I 1979).
In re Chaffin, 4 B.R. 324 (D. Kan. 1980).
This is a real concern and is evidenced by the following.
The effect of the new Chapter 13 is shocking. In the last four months
before October 1, [1979], Chapter XI plans before this Judge alone were
as follows:
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lacking good faith. 9
It is required in 11 U.S.C. section 1325(a)(6) that the pay-
ment plan proposed by the debtor be feasible.7 0 Notwith-
standing the fact that feasibility is stated as a separate condi-
tion of confirmation, several courts have paired this
requirement with 11 U.S.C. section 1325(a)(3) and have held
that a plan that is not feasible is not filed in good faith.7 1
Since a zero payment to unsecured creditors will always be
feasible, these courts have examined other aspects of the pro-
100% plans 83%
50-99% plans none
11-49% plans 7%
6-10% plans 5%
5% or less plans 2%
Chapter 13 plans from October 1, 1979 through
March 1980 were:
100% plans 29%
50-99% plans 2%
11-59% [sic] plans 4%
6-10% plans 26%
5% or less plans 38%
The trend is indicated by the last month (March)
alone:
100% plans 5%
50-99% plans none
11-49% plans 2%
6-10% plans 36%
5% or less plans 53%
Only 56 cases under Chapter 13 were filed in October, 1979, but, of
these, 70% were 100% plans.
In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 559 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
19 Compare note 63 supra (statement on this point contained in In re Bloom, 3
B.R. 467 (C.D. Cal. 1980)) with the following excerpt: "[I]t is the opinion of this court
that failure of the legislature to set a fixed percentage test for Chapter 13 composi-
tions was not intended as a loophole through which debtors could ... obtain yearly
discharges through the filing of plans with nominal or no payments to unsecured
creditors." In re Montano, 4 B.R. 535, 538 (D.D.C. 1980).
70 See note 10 supra for the text of this statute.
7' In re Barnes, 5 B.R. 376 (D.D.C. 1980); In re Coleman, 5 B.R. 81 (W.D. Ky.
1980); In re Howard, 3 B.R. 75 (S.D. Cal. 1980). See also In re Nance, 4 B.R. 50
(W.D. Mo. 1980), in which a 100% plan was refused confirmation on good faith
grounds because it lacked feasibility. In Nance, unsecured creditors would have re-
ceived 93% under a Chapter 7 liquidation.
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posed plans when assessing feasibility. The proffer of a plan
that cannot be completed due to the debtor's limited re-
sources is seen as an indication that the debtor is seeking the
advantages of Chapter 13 without demonstrating the required
good faith.
There is perhaps cause to wonder why Congress continues
to make Chapter 7 available to debtors at all if zero payment
plans are available under Chapter 13. In view of the liberal
relief available under Chapter 13, it has been suggested that
attorneys recommending Chapter 7 may even be guilty of
malpractice.72 In response to this question, several courts havY
held that zero payment plans should be converted into Chap-
ter 7 cases,7 s as Chapter 7 is the appropriate vehicle for debtor
relief in no-payment situations. 4 This approach is consistent
with the perception that Chapter 7 was intended by Congress
to provide different relief than that made available under
Chapter 13.
C. How Much Is Enough?
Assuming that one or more of the arguments heretofore
advanced is correct and that good faith requires some pay-
ment to unsecured creditors under Chapter 13, there remains
the sticky question of how much is enough. The lacovoni
court approached this question from several directions before
settling on its oft-cited 5 yet inexact mandate that good faith
requires an "effort to make meaningful payment to holders of
unsecured claims."76 The court first noted that 11 U.S.C. sec-
tion 727(a)(9)7 7 provides for a discharge under Chapter 7
within six years of a discharge under Chapter 13 only if: 1) at
" Cyr, supra note 2, at 81. On why Congress did not limit the availability of
Chapter 7 to only those cases in which Chapter 13 would not provide adequate relief,
see H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 14, at 6081.
" In re DeSimone, 6 B.R. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Barnes, 5 B.R. 376 (D.D.C.
1980); In re Johnson, 5 B.R. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Beaver, 2 B.R. 337 (S.D. Cal.
1980); In re Godfrey, 4 B.R. 485 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
" This authority is granted in 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (Supp. In 1979).
75 E.g., In re Henry, 4 B.R. 220 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Marlow, 3 B.R. 305
(N.D. IM. 1980); In re Beaver, 2 B.R. 337 (S.D. Cal. 1980).
76 2 B.R. at 267.
11 See note 102 infra for the text of this statute.
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least seventy percent of allowed unsecured claims have been
paid; 2) the plan was proposed in good faith, and; 3) the plan
also represented the debtor's best effort. The Iacovoni court
found this to be an obvious attempt by Congress to encourage
high repayment plans.78
The seventy percent requirement of 11 U.S.C. section
727(a)(9) was interpreted by the court as an upper limit; good
faith would require no more. The court then turned to 11
U.S.C. section 1325(a)(4) to establish a minimum. The express
wording of section 1325(a)(4) is that a creditor should receive
'"not less than" the amount that would be paid under a Chap-
ter 7 liquidation.7 9 The court, however, viewed this language
as a mere attempt to avoid certain construction problems, re-
jected it as a lower threshold, and found that in most cases it
should be read to require more than a creditqr would receive
under Chapter 7.80 It was then noted that the "best effort"
requirement is absent from Chapter 13, although it appears in
tandem with "good faith" in 11 U.S.C. section 727. The court
concluded that although less than a "best effort" is therefore
acceptable in Chapter 13, the effort given must be tempered 8
78 2 B.R. at 267. The court in In re Burrell, 2 B.R. 650 (N.D. Cal. 1980), em-
ployed this same argument to require that a Chapter 13 plan pay 70% or be refused
confirmation for lack of good faith. On appeal to the district court, this part of the
bankruptcy court's holding was specifically reversed. In re Burrell, 6 B.R. 360 (N.D.
Cal. 1980). A similar approach was taken by the court in In re Raburn, 4 B.R. 624
(M.D. Ga. 1980), which stated that "[s]ubstantial payment and best effort require-
ments must be read into 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). And Congress has defined 'substantial'
as 70 percent or more of allowed unsecured claims." Id. at 625.
79 See note 10 supra for the text of this statute.
80 It seems reasonable to conclude ... that the wording of Section
1325(a)(4) requiring "not less than" the amount that would be received
under a Chapter 7 liquidation, rather than "more than" which appears to
be the intent by terms of the House Report, may be so as not to force a
debtor who would be able to distribute 100 percent payment under Chapter
7 to pay more than 100 percent under Chapter 13 as well as to impose a
firm minimum upon which a flexible "good faith" requirement for addi-
tional payments could be based.
2 B.R. at 266.
81 By necessity, such a good faith effort must be interpreted equitably
and flexibly. The following factors may be considered in determining
whether a good faith effort to make meaningful payment to holders of un-
secured claims has been made:
1. The budget of the debtor, i.e., how much the debtor feasibly can pay.
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by requiring that the debtor undertake "a good faith effort to
make meaningful[ 82] payment to holders of unsecured
claims."8 3
III. DISMISSING GOOD FAITH AS AN AMOUNT REQUIREMENT
A number of courts have remained unconvinced that good
faith requires some minimum payment to unsecured creditors
under Chapter 13.84 These courts frequently emphasize the
"fresh start" philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code85 and the
burdensome situation of the consumer debtor.86 Consistent
2. The future income and payment prospects of the debtor.
3. The dollar amount of debts outstanding, and the proposed percent-
age of repayment.
4. The nature of the debts sought to be discharged; specifically, to what
extent the debtor is invoking the advantage of the broader Chapter 13 dis-
charge which may carry with it concomitant obligations of repayment
effort.
2 B.R. at 267 (footnotes deleted).
8'2 Meaningful to whom is another question. In this regard, see In re Hall, 4 B.R.
341 (E.D. Va. 1980). "Although in light of the Debtors' monthly income the... pay-
ment proposed by the Debtors is a significant monthly payment, the Court finds that
payment to unsecured creditors of approximately 6% of their claims is not meaning-
ful or substantial." Id. at 342.
8 2 B.R. at 267. A majority of courts have adopted the "meaningful" test, and
several have augmented it with such companion terms as "significant" and "substan-
tial." As might be expected, however, there has been less agreement on the amounts
expressed by these terms. The court in In re Raburn, 4 B.R. 624 (M.D. Ga. 1970),
held that a payment of less than 70% would not be "meaningful" or "substantial." In
re White, 4 B.R. 349 (E.D. Va. 1980), held that a payment of 28% which was less
than the debtor's best effort was not "substantial and meaningful." On the other
hand, a 27% plan was sufficient for confirmation in In re Ryals, 3 B.R. 522 (E.D.
Tenn. 1980). There are, of course, several courts that have confirmed zero or 1%
payment plans. E.g., In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Harland, 3 B.R.
597 (D. Neb. 1970); In re Webb, 3 B.R. 61 (N.D. Cal. 1980). So far, however, no court
has called a zero or nominal payment plan "meaningful."
E.g., In re Terry, 3 B.R. 63 (W.D. Ark.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980); In
re Roy, 5 B.R. 611 (M.D. Ala. 1980); In re Garcia, 6 B.R. 35 (D. Kan. 1980); In re
Thebeau, 3 B.R. 537 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
s8 This Court on numerous occasions has confirmed zero or minimal pay
Chapter 13 plans .... The rationale for such confirmation has been that
so long as creditors receive no less than they would in a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion they are not harmed .... The fresh start concept is certainly not at
odds with such a use of Chapter 13 ....
In re Chaffin, 4 B.R. 324, 325 (D. Kan. 1980).
8 The debtor has priority debts in the approximate amount of $10,000.00.
These debts are nondischargeable in Chapter 7 and subject to priority
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with this philosophy, efforts at fashioning a minimum amount
requirement from the good faith provisions of 11 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1325(a)(3) are seen as unauthorized attempts at "judicial
legislation. 8 7 The primary arguments offered in support of
this position are based upon legislative history, upon certain
definitional aspects of good faith, and upon equitable
considerations.
A. Rebuttals Based on Legislative History
Just as opponents of zero payment plans base their objec-
tions upon the legislative history of the good faith require-
ment, proponents of such plans often support their view by
pointing to the same legislative history. Courts tending to up-
hold zero payment plans are quick to remind objectors that
Congress itself advanced no express minimum amount re-
quirement.18 Congress, it is contended, obviously meant for
good faith to refer to something other than the amount of
payment proposed in the debtor's plan, since there is already
treatment in Chapter 13. The holders of the debts are garnishing the
debtor's wages. Chapter 13 is the only relief available to the debtor. For the
court to hold that this debtor is ineligible for relief under Chapter 13
merely because de minimis payments are being made to unsecured credi-
tors not only is contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed in the Chap-
ter 13 legislation but is to hold that this debtor cannot obtain any meaning-
ful relief under the Bankruptcy Code. This court as the interpreter of
legislation and not the maker of legislation is not so empowered. Failure to
confirm the plan would. . . deny the debtor the relief to which he is enti-
tled in order that he be rehabilitated as a producing member of the eco-
nomic society and be allowed the fresh start to which Congress stated he is
entitled.
In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123, 125-26 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). See also In re Roy, 5 B.R. 611, 613
(M.D. Ala. 1980).
'7 "Such judicial maneuvering constitutes appropriation of legislative power." In
re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536, 536-37 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
The Court ... finds no support for requiring a 70% payment or any
other specific percent payment from a debtor in a composition plan either
in the Code or its predecessor. Furthermore, the terms "substantial" and
"meaningful" are not definitive terms, have resulted in diverse judgments
and are nowhere to be found in the Code as requirements for confirmation.
Certainly good faith was not so defined by Congress. It did not supply any
definition for that term either in the Code or the Legislative History.
In re Garcia, 6 B.R. 35, 38 (D. Kan. 1980); accord, In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584, 586 (D.
Colo. 1980).
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a statutory minimum for automatic approval provided in 11
U.S.C. section 1325(a)(4).89
Similarly, courts rejecting good faith as an amount re-
quirement have indicated that to do otherwise unnecessarily
complicates the operation of Chapter 13 for both courts and
debtors.90 It is argued that the legislative history of Chapter
13 clearly indicates an intention to remove the complications
and misunderstandings of the old Chapter XIII. 1 This being
true, it would run counter to both congressional intent and
judicial efficiency 92 to reinvite the old problems by engrafting
onto Chapter 13 an inexact amount requirement that does not
expressly appear in the statute.3 Judicial inconsistency and
attorney uncertainty are eliminated by applying 11 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1325 mechanically.
Proponents of the position that Chapter 13 good faith is
not violated by zero payment plans have employed several ar-
89 This Court is of the opinion that "good faith" must be referring to some-
thing other than the amount of payments to unsecured [creditors], because
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) specifically sets forth the amount which, if paid to
unsecured [creditors], mandates confirmation. To require more than what
Congress has said is enough is usurpation of legislative powers.
In re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536, 536-37 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
9 "This Court does not intend to complicate the simple procedure that Congress
enacted in Chapter 13 by creating a maze of judicial mirrors, angles, cul-de-sacs and
other assorted dead-ends, all under the guise of 'good-faith."' In re Thebeau, 3 B.R.
537, 539 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
9 See text accompanying note 42 supra for support of this proposition.
" "The Iacovoni view of good faith would make it an issue in nearly every Chap-
ter 13 case." In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584, 587 (D. Colo. 1980).
" First, there is nothing in the previous bankruptcy law, in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, or in the legislative history of the Act to indicate that "good
faith" was intended to have such a meaning. Second, once such a proposi-
tion is adopted, the concept of good faith becomes a very subjective deci-
sion as can be seen from the already reported cases. The result will be that
what is good faith will vary dramatically from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
and even within jurisdictions having multiple judges.
In re Harland, 3 B.R. 597, 599 (D. Neb. 1980).
The Court can think of nothing more disheartening and frustrating to a
debtor in this type of proceeding than to be told that he or she has met the
standards expressly set forth in § 1325, has met an imputed requirement of
best effort but has failed an imputed and engrafted substantial or meaning-
ful payment requirement.... All the debtor wished to do was his or her
best. Would that all debtors appearing before this Court did.
In re Garcia, 6 B.R. 35, 38 (D. Kan. 1980).
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guments to rebut the claim that legislative history is to the
contrary. Asserting that 11 U.S.C. section 1325 is sufficiently
clear as written, one court has stated that legislative history is
irrelevant. 4 This same court did, however, address the issue
of whether Congress had intended to require payments to un-
secured creditors under Chapter 13. Based upon statutory
construction principles, the court agreed with the Iacovoni
analysis that payments of some type were indeed intended. It
was strongly argued, however, that those payments could be
to secured creditors only and that the Iacovoni position that
Congress meant to improve the lot of unsecured creditors was
simply unfounded. 5
Courts that tend to accept zero or nominal payment plans
have gotten much mileage 6 out of a passage in the House Re-
port that states: "The bill requires only that creditors receive
under the plan more than they would if the debtor went into
straight bankruptcy. 9 7 The congressional footnote to this
statement refers to proposed language that eventually became
11 U.S.C. section 1325(a)(4).1 From this it is argued that the
use of the word "only" indicates that Congress intended the
statutory minimum of 11 U.S.C. section 1325(a)(4) to be the
exclusive amount requirement under Chapter 13. Moreover,
since the language of the proposal referred to in the footnote
was at that time "not less than" rather than "more," it is
maintained that "not less than" controls and that Congress
recognized and approved the possibility of zero payment plans
" "Where the meaning of a statute is clear on its face, courts may not resort to
legislative history to justify a different interpretation." In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584, 585
(D. Colo. 1980) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
95 lacovoni suggests, however, that "[t]he payments contemplated by the
statute and its proponents are to creditors holding unsecured claims." This
conclusion cannot be supported. To the extent a debtor chooses to "cram
down" a secured creditor under § 1325(a)(5)(B), plan payments will neces-
sarily be made in cash or other property to the creditor. In addition, debt-
ors can pay their attorneys' fees and other priority claims, such as taxes, by
deferred cash payments through the plan .... The payments allowed by
the statute are obviously not limited to payments to unsecured creditors.
In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584, 585-86 (D. Colo. 1980).
" See id. at 586-87.
H. R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 14, at 6084-85 (emphasis added).
'" See note 10 supra for the text of this statute.
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under Chapter 13.
A considerably more persuasive argument in support of
zero payment plans has been derived from the so-called Tech-
nical Amendments Bill.99 As originally proposed, this amend-
ment of the Bankruptcy Code would have changed 11 U.S.C.
section 1325(a)(3) °10 to read: "The plan is the debtor's best
effort and has been proposed in good faith and not by any
means forbidden by law." 101 "Best effort" language, which
does appear in the present Bankruptcy Code in section
727(a)(9)(B), 0 is considered an amount requirement in the
bankruptcy context.103 Thus, it is argued, the attempt to in-
sert "best effort" language into 11 U.S.C. section 1325(a)(3)
proves that the section as originally passed did not contain an
amount requirement.1 04 The subsequent deletion of this par-
S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 188 (1979).
100 See note 10 supra for the text of this statute as it now appears.
101 S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 188 (1979).
102 (a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless-
(9) the debtor has been granted a discharge under section 1328 of this title,
or under section 660 or 661 of the Bankruptcy Act, in a case commenced
within six years before the date of the filing of the petition, unless pay-
ments under the plan in such case totaled at least-
(B)(i) 70 percent of such claims; and
(ii)the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith, and was the
debtor's best effort ....
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9)(B) (1979) (emphasis added). See also In re Armstrong, 3 B.R.
615 (D. Ore. 1980) ("best effort" and "good faith" not synonymous).
103 That the proposed amendment of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) was intended to op-
erate as a flexible amount requirement is amply demonstrated by the comments of
Bankruptcy Judge Conrad Cyr, United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Maine, which appears in the Committee Report accompanying the Technical Amend-
ments Bill:
The purpose of . . . subsection 1325(a)(3) is to prevent the use of
Chapter 13 composition plans by debtors having a demonstrated ability,
but not the willingness, to make whatever payments their particular cir-
cumstances reasonably permit over and above their primary obligations to
support themselves and their dependents during the extension period.
HousE COMM. ON THE JUDIciARY, REPORT TO ACCOtiPANY S. 658, H.R. REP. No. 96-
1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1980).
104 "It is significant that the proposed amendment inserts a 'best effort' test and
does not delete the 'good faith' requirement. Apparently Congress itself does not con-
sider that good faith is tied to any concept of a minimum payment schedule." In re
Harland, 3 B.R. 597, 599 (D. Neb. 1980).
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ticular change from the Technical Amendments Bill before its
passage105 has been taken as a further indication that Con-
gress did not intend that good faith in Chapter 13 should be
construed as an amount requirement.10 6
B. The Definitional Factor
Courts which are willing to confirm zero or nominal pay-
ment plans in the face of 11 U.S.C. section 1325(a)(3) are
quick to point out that good faith in the bankruptcy context
traditionally applies to motive and not to amount.1 07 As stated
by the court in In re Cloutier:108
The words "proposed in good faith" are entitled to their his-
torical meaning. This Court has not been cited to and has
not found any case quantifying "good faith" so that the
amount to be paid to unsecured creditors was considered too
small to meet the statutory requirement.
Hernandez v. Borgos, 343 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1965), is an ex-
ample of the application of the good faith test under old
chapter proceedings. That case held that a Chapter XII plan
was not proposed in good faith where it was used as a vehi-
cle to make assets unavailable to pay the debtor's child sup-
port obligation. Collier's suggests: "Undoubtedly, there are
other extraordinary circumstances in which the good-faith
test may come into play."
In short, Collier's envisions, and this Court agrees, that
good faith is lacking only in those unusual cases in which
there has been an abuse of the provisions, purposes or spirit
of Chapter 13.109
105 S. 658, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. H9290 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980).
106 "It is this Court's opinion that Congress has effectively precluded a best effort
test by considering and rejecting it and that it should not be back doored under the
guise of good faith." In re McMinn, 4 B.R. 150, 152 (D. Kan. 1980).
107 E.g., In re Seely, 6 B.R. 309 (E.D. Va. 1980) (excellent discussion of good faith
in Chapter 13 context even though zero payment plan not involved); In re Harland, 3
B.R. 597 (D. Neb. 1980); In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584 (D. Colo. 1980). In this regard it
should be noted that the Iacovoni court itself admitted that its definition of good
faith "follows no traditional bankruptcy meaning of the phrase." 2 B.R. at 268.
108 3 B.R. 584 (D. Colo. 1980).
,19 Id. at 586-87 (footnotes deleted). The Cloutier court did encounter such an
"unusual case" in In re Tanke, 4 B.R. 339 (D. Colo. 1980), and it refused to confirm a
Chapter 13 plan proposing to pay $1.00 each to unsecured creditors where the Chap-
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C. Equitable Considerations
Courts inclined to confirm zero or nominal payment plans
have frequently relied on equitable principles to defend this
practice when the good faith issue has been raised.110 Zero
payment plans, it is contended, do not unfairly surprise credi-
tors since bankruptcy laws have historically been liberally
construed in favor of debtors"' and because it is the essence
of bankruptcy law that debtors will be discharged from their
obligations. 12 Conversely, it would unfairly surprise debtors
to deny them the relief that the law promises.113 Furthermore,
the creditor is not disadvantaged in practical terms, since 11
U.S.C. section 1325(a)(4) provides that he cannot receive less
than he would have received had the debtor's estate been liq-
uidated under Chapter 7.114 The upshot of this logic is that
the continued existence of the debtor's right to file under
Chapter 7 leaves unsecured creditors without an equitable leg
to stand on should the debtor elect Chapter 13.115
ter 13 filing was the final step in a scheme to defraud the creditors.
110 E.g., In re Koerperich, 5 B.R. 752 (D. Neb. 1980); In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123
(M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Chaffin, 4 B.R. 324 (D. Kan. 1980) (confirmation denied on
other grounds); In re Thebeau, 3 B.R. 537 (E.D. Ark. 1980); In re Berry, 5 B.R. 515
(S.D. Ohio 1980).
" In re Thebeau, 3 B.R. 537, 538 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
112 There is nothing at variance with the underlying concept of the bank-
ruptcy laws for debtors to be discharged without paying anything to credi-
tors. If there were, then the majority of bankruptcy cases could not qualify.
It is well known that there are no assets available for unsecured creditors
in the overwhelming majority of bankruptcy cases.
Id. at 539 (emphasis added).
Is "I... will not find a debtor to be in bad faith for doing what he is legally
permitted to do." In re Koerperich, 5 B.R. 752, 755 (D. Neb. 1980).
I'4 See note 85 supra for a concise statement of this position.
115 [I]t is difficult to see what Public Finance has to gain by objecting to
confirmation of this plan. The cards fate dealt to Public ultimately will en-
able Public to realize either 1% (Chapter 13) or 0% (Chapter 7) on its
claim. There is no genuine interest of Public which this Court would pre-
serve or protect in denying the Chapter 13 remedy to the Debtors in this
case.
In re Johnson, 6 B.R. 34, 35 (N.D. IM. 1980).
A finding of "good faith" of debtor should not be based exclusively on the
court's gastronomic reaction to the quantum received by creditors, if the
"best interest" test has been met, because debtors have been afforded an
unqualified right to conversion to a case under Chapter 7 at any time ....
In re Berry, 5 B.R. 515, 517 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
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A noticeable theme running throughout the equitable ar-
guments is that there is a "higher" equity that courts must
observe, an equity which stems from an obligation of fairness
to society."' i Rehabilitation of the debtor, it is suggested, is
good not only for the debtor and his or her dependents, but
for all of society. As a consequence, so long as creditors are
protected by 11 U.S.C. section 1325(a)(4), the rehabilitation of
the debtor will carry the day,117 even if that rehabilitation in-
volves confirmation of zero payment plans.118
IV. TRENDS IN REPORTED CASES
An examination of the reported case law involving zero or
"nominal payment plans has disclosed fifty-eight cases in
which the good faith issue has been raised.11 9 These cases
116 E.g., In re Roy, 5 B.R. 611 (M.D. Ala. 1980); In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123 (M.D.
Tenn. 1980). See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1977), re-
printed in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, which contains the following
passage:
The court will necessarily be required to consider the debtor's ability to
meet his primary obligation to support his dependents, because otherwise
the plan is unlikely to succeed. Moreover, it may force the debtor or his
dependents to become a public charge, to the detriment of the debtor, his
dependents, his creditors, and the public.
/d. at 6085.
117 The Trustee's final argument is that it is "inequitable" to have a
Chapter 13 without payment to creditors. This Court fails to see the lack of
equity. Creditors would be no better off if these debtors filed a Chapter 7
for the creditors would still receive nothing.
In short, no one is injured by allowing these debtors to discharge their
debts via Chapter 13. The only thing at stake is some "ivory tower" concept
relating to a supposed but congressionally unarticulated "raison de etre" for
Chapter 13. Poor debtors before this court will not be denied relief from
their debts in order to pay homage to antiquated procedural concepts.
In re Thebeau, 3 B.R. 537, 539 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
"' The merit of this position is reflected in the fact that even those courts that
follow the Iacovoni doctrine have made occasional exceptions and confirmed zero or
nominal payment plans on equitable grounds. See, e.g., In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123 (M.D.
Tenn. 1980); Matter of Johnson, 6 B.R. 34 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Bellgraph, 4 B.R.
421 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
"' In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'g 3 B.R. 63 (W.D. Ark. 1980); In
re Heard, No. 38000966 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 7, 1980); In re Hurd, 6 B.R. 329 (N.D. Ind.
1980); In re Burns, 6 B.R. 286 (D. Colo. 1980); In re Koerperich, 5 B.R. 752 (D. Neb.
1980); In re Blackwell, 5 B.R. 748 (W.D. Mich. 1980); In re Ward, 6 B.R. 93 (M.D.
Fla. 1980); In re DeSimone, 6 B.R. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Burrell, 6 B.R. 360 (N.D.
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have been argued before one circuit court and twenty-eight
district courts in twenty-one states and the District of Colum-
bia. To date, the Eighth Circuit and twenty-three district
courts in seventeen states and the District of Columbia have
on some occasion rejected zero or nominal payment plans be-
cause such plans were thought to lack good faith either in the
amount proposed or in the feasibility of the plan.120 On the
Cal. 1980), rev'g 2 B.R. 650 (N.D. Cal. 1980); In re Stollenwerck, 5 B.R. 616 (M.D.
Ala. 1980); In re Roy, 5 B.R. 611 (M.D. Ala. 1980); In re Manning, 5 B.R. 387
(W.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Barnes, 5 B.R. 376 (D.D.C. 1980); In re Lockwood, 5 B.R. 294
(S.D. Fla. 1980); In re Garcia, 6 B.R. 35 (D. Kan. 1980); In re Frederickson, 5 B.R.
199 (M.D. Fla. 1980); In re Goeb, 4 B.R. 735 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123
(M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Johnson, 6 B.R. 34 (N.D. IlL. 1980); In re Murallo, 4 B.R.
666 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Raburn, 4 B.R. 624 (M.D. Ga. 1980); In re Hobday, 4 B.R.
417 (N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Bellgraph 4 B.R. 421 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Kovich, 4
B.R. 403 (W.D. Mich. 1980); In re Seman, 4 B.R. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Hurd, 4
B.R. 551 (W.D. Mich. 1980); In re Montano, 4 B.R. 535 (D.D.C. 1980); In re Schongal-
la, 4 B.R. 360 (D. Md. 1980); In re Tanke, 4 B.R. 339 (D. Colo. 1980); In re White, 4
B.R. 349 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Coleman, 5 B.R. 812 (W.D. Ky. 1980); In re Hall, 4
B.R. 341 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Chaffin, 4 B.R. 324 (D. Kan. 1980); In re Patterson, 4
B.R. 239 (C.D. Cal. 1980); In re Henry, 4 B.R. 220 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Johnson,
5 B.R. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1980); In re McMinn, 4 B.R. 150 (D. Kan. 1980); In re Harland,
3 B.R. 597 (D. Neb. 1980); In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584 (D. Colo. 1980); In re Thebeau, 3
B.R. 537 (E.D. Ark. 1980); In re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536 (E.D. Ark. 1980); In re Ryals, 3
B.R. 522 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346 (S.D. W. Va. 1980); In re Cook, 3
B.R. 480 (S.D. W. Va. 1980); In re Bloom, 3 B.R. 467 (C.D. Cal. 1980); In re Marlow,
3 B.R. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Lucas, 3 B.R. 252 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Berry, 5
B.R. 515 (S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Anderson, 3 B.R. 160 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Keckler,
3 B.R. 155 (N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Howard, 3 B.R. 75 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Webb, 3
B.R. 61 (N.D. Cal. 1980); In re Campbell, 3 B.R. 57 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Beaver, 2
B.R. 337 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Powell, 2 B.R. 314 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2
B.R. 256 (D. Utah 1980); In re Godfrey, 4 B.R. 484 (S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Nickels, 4
B.R. 481 (S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Curtis, 2 B.R. 43 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
120 In re Terry, 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'g 3 B.R. 63 (E.D. Ark. 1980); In
re Heard, No. 38000966 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 7, 1980); In re Hurd, 6 B.R. 329 (N.D. Ind.
1980); In re Bums, 6 B.R. 286 (D. Colo. 1980); In re Blackwell, 5 B.R. 748 (W.D.
Mich. 1980); In re Ward, 6 B.R. 93 (M.D. Fla. 1980); In re DeSimone, 6 B.R. 89
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Burrell, 6 B.R. 360 (N.D. Cal. 1980), rev'g 2 B.R. 650 (N.D.
Cal. 1980); In re Manning, 5 B.R. 387 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Barnes, 5 B.R. 376
(D.D.C. 1980); In re Lockwood, 5 B.R. 294 (S.D. Fla. 1980); In re Fredrickson, 5 B.R.
199 (M.D. Fla. 1980); In re Goeb, 4 B.R. 735 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Murallo, 4 B.R.
666 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Raburn, 4 B.R. 624 (M.D. Ga. 1980); In re Hobday, 4 B.R.
417 (N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Seman, 4 B.R. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Hurd, 4 B.R.
551 (W.D. Mich. 1980); In re Montano, 4 B.R. 535 (D.D.C. 1980); In re Schongalla, 4
B.R. 360 (D. Md. 1980); In re Tanke, 4 B.R. 339 (D. Colo. 1980); In re White, 4 B.R.
349 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Coleman, 5 B.R. 812 (W.D. Ky. 1980); In re Hall, 4 B.R.
341 (E.D. Va. 1980); In re Chaffin, 4 B.R. 324 (D. Kan. 1980); In re Patterson, 4 B.R.
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other hand, fourteen district courts in twelve states have on
some occasion found that a zero or nominal payment plan did
not violate the good faith requirement of 11 U.S.C. section
1325(a)(3). 21 This latter group, already in the minority, may
soon suffer some attrition due to the Eighth Circuit's reversal
of the confirmation of a zero or nominal payment plan in In re
Terry.122 In any event, the Iacovoni doctrine that zero or
nominal payment plans violate good faith is being followed by
the majority of courts at this time.
Furthermore, the case law on the subject continues to
devote much discusson to the debtor's "best effort." This re-
mains true even though "best effort" is arguably irrelevant
following the deletion of that phrase from the Technical
Amendments Bill, 123 and despite the fact that many courts
have taken great pains to state that a "best effort" is not re-
quired under Chapter 13.124 In the eighteen cases that confirm
239 (C.D. Cal. 1980); In re Henry, 4 B.R. 220 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Johnson, 5
B.R. 40 (S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346 (S.D. W. Va. 1980); In re Cook, 3
B.R. 480 (S.D. W. Va. 1980); In re Bloom, 3 B.R. 467 (D.C. Cal. 1980); In re Marlow,
3 B.R. 305 (N.D. Il. 1980); In re Lucas, 3 B.R. 252 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Anderson, 3
B.R. 160 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Howard, 3 B.R. 75 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Campbell, 3
B.R. 57 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Beaver, 2 B.R. 337 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 2
B.R. 256 (D. Utah 1980); In re Godfrey, 4 B.R. 485 (S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Nickels, 4
B.R. 481 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
121 In re Koerperich, 5 B.R. 752 (D. Neb. 1980); In re Stollenwerck, 5 B.R. 616
(M.D. Ala. 1980); In re Roy, 5 B.R. 611 (M.D. Ala. 1980); In re Garcia, 6 B.R. 35 (D.
Kan. 1980); In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Johnson, 6 B.R. 34 (N.D.
Ill. 1980); In re Bellgraph, 4 B.R. 421 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Kovich, 4 B.R. 403
(W.D. Mich. 1980); In re McMinn, 4 B.R. 150 (D. Kan. 1980) (confirmation denied on
other grounds); In re Harlan, 3 B.R. 597 (D. Neb. 1980); In re Cloutier, 3 B.R. 584 (D.
Colo. 1980); In re Thebeau, 3 B.R. 537 (E.D. Ark. 1980); In re Sadler, 3 B.R. 536 (E.D.
Ark. 1980); In re Ryals, 3 B.R. 522 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Berry, 5 B.R. 515 (S.D.
Ohio 1980); In re Keckler, 3 B.R. 155 (N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Webb, 3 B.R. 61 (N.D.
Cal. 1980); In re Curtis, 2 B.R. 43 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
122 630 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'g 3 B.R. 63 (W.D. Ark. 1980). In spite of the
court's statement that "we cannot agree that a Chapter 13 plan to pay nothing may
be in good faith," this case may be distinguished on the basis that no secured credi-
tors were involved. Thus, the debtors were proposing no payments to anyone. Id. at
635. Had there been some "payments" involved, perhaps the court would not have
found the plan violative of good faith. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text
for a discussion of the "payment" requirement.
121 See notes 99-106 supra and accompanying text for discussion of this point.
12, E.g., In re McMinn, 4 B.R. 150 (D. Kan. 1980) (confirmation denied on other
grounds); In re Harland, 3 B.R. 597 (D. Neb. 1980); In re Iacovoni, 3 B.R. 256 (D.
Utah 1980). Contra, In re Raburn, 4 B.R. 624 (M.D. Ga. 1980).
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zero or nominal payment plans,125 seven contain findings by
the court that the proposed plan did indeed represent the
debtor's "best effort." '126 Four of these cases were from courts
that would ordinarily be disposed to reject nominal payment
plans; however, faced with debtors in exceptionally difficult
circumstances and presented with evidence that the proposed
plans were the debtors' "best efforts," these courts proceeded
to confirm no-payment plans.
127
"Best effort" has also been a significant factor to courts
that have rejected zero or nominal payment plans. Of forty
such cases, 2" the fact that the proposed plan was not the
debtor's "best effort" was noted by the court in fourteen
1 20
The debtor's "best effort," however, remains a significant factor to many courts.
See In re Keckler, 3 B.R. 155 (N.D. Ohio 1980), termed a "horror story" for creditors
because of its acceptance of the dischargeability of fraudulently-incurred debts under
Chapter 13. MAPOTHER, supra note 5, at 117. The debtor in Keckler proposed a plan
to pay 5% to the victim of the embezzlement (an act for which the debtor had al-
ready been convicted). This plan was confirmed by the court. Though not emphasized
in the reported opinion, the Keckler court was apparently influenced by the rehabili-
tative aspects of Chapter 13 and the fact that 5% was indeed the debtor's "best ef-
fort." Keckler was cited in In re Blackwell, 5 B.R. 748 (W.D. Mich. 1980), as an ex-
ample of "best effort" and "exceptional circumstances" in contrast to the 5% plan
before that court which was denied confirmation. Similarly, the court in In re Tanke,
4 B.R. 339 (D. Colo. 1980), denied confirmation to a plan paying $1.00 to unsecured
creditors but cited Keckler as an example of both "good faith" and "best effort."
115 See note 121 supra for a list of these cases.
126 In re Stollenwerck, 5 B.R. 616 (M.D. Ala. 1980); In re Roy, 5 B.R. 611 (M.D.
Ala. 1980); In re Garcia, 6 B.R. 35 (D. Kan. 1980); In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123 (M.D. Tenn.
1980); In re Bellgraph, 4 B.R. 421 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Keckler, 3 B.R. 155 (N.D.
Ohio 1980); In re Curtis, 2 B.R. 43 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
'27 In re Moss, 5 B.R. 123 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Bellgraph, 4 B.R. 421
(W.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Keckler, 3 B.R. 155 (N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Curtis, 2 B.R. 43
(W.D. Mo. 1980). Bellgraph involved a debtor who was divorced, had one child living
at home, and whose sole income was from child support of $50 per month and Social
Security Disability, SSI, and Public Assistance. The debtor was totally disabled and
was receiving medical treatment for emphysema, back problems and nerves. In con-
firming the debtor's zero payment plan, the court stated: "This plan because of the
debtor's limited income is not only her 'best effort,' a test considered too strict under
the Code, but it is a super effort by the debtor to pay her debts and maintain her
home." 4 B.R. at 423-24. But see In re Manning, 5 B.R. 387 (N.D.N.Y. 1980). Decided
in a neighboring district and citing Bellgraph as an example of "best effort," this case
denied confirmation of a zero payment plan on good faith grounds, the court noting
that the debtors could obtain additional income by renting out the upper unit of their
home. Id. at 388.
12 See note 120 supra for a list of these cases.
119 In re Burns, 6 B.R. 286 (D. Colo. 1980); In re Blackwell, 5 B.R. 748 (W.D.
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and implied in another.130 "Best effort" is not, however, a
"magic phrase," and standing alone it may not be enough to
gain confirmation of a zero or nominal payment plan. This is
made clear by the eleven courts that have refused to confirm
such plans even while admitting that they did indeed re-
present the debtors' "best efforts."13'
V. THE OUTLOOK IN KENTUCKY
To date, only one Kentucky case touching on good faith
and zero or nominal payment plans has been reported.""2 Soon
to be reported is In re Heard,13 also from the state's western
district. These two decisions by Judge Merritt Deitz refused
to confirm nominal payment plans of $1.00 and 1 percent, re-
spectively. Precisely on point so far as this discussion is con-
cerned, In re Heard contains the direct and forceful statement
by Judge Deitz that: "Although the Court will not adopt an
expressed lowest monetary limit of good faith, a zero or one
(1 %) percent plan will not be confirmed in any event."1 3 Af-
ter noting that good faith as it relates to the proposed pay-
ment plan is a determination that must be made on the facts
of each case, Judge Deitz speaks of the debtor's "best effort"
in these words: "The mere fact that a debtor is making his
best effort is not enough to constitute good faith under the
Mich. 1980); In re Manning, 5 B.R. 387 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551
(W.D. Mich. 1980); In re Montano, 4 B.R. 535 (D.D.C. 1980); In re Schongalla, 4 B.R.
360 (D. Md. 1980); In re Tanke, 4 B.R. (D. Colo. 1980); In re White, 4 B.R. 349 (E.D.
Va. 1980); In re Henry, 4 B.R. 220 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Johnson, 5 B.R. 40 (S.D.
Ohio 1980); In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346 (S.D. W. Va. 1980); In re Bloom, 3 B.R. 467 (C.D.
Cal. 1980); In re Marlow, 3 B.R. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Anderson, 3 B.R. 160 (S.D.
Cal. 1980).
130 In re Hall, 4 B.R. 341 (E.D. Va. 1980).
,3, In re Heard, No. 38000966 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 7, 1980); In re Hurd, 6 B.R. 329
(N.D. Ind. 1980); In re Barnes, 5 B.R. 376 (D.D.C. 1980); In re Lockwood, 5 B.R. 294
(S.D. Fla. 1980); In re Fredrickson, 5 B.R. 199 (M.D. Fla. 1980); In re Goeb, 4 B.R.
735 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Murallo, 4 B.R. 666 (D. Conn. 1980); In re Coleman, 5 B.R.
812 (W.D. Ky. 1980); In re Cook, 3 B.R. 480 (S.D. W. Va. 1980); In re Lucas, 3 B.R.
252 (S.D. Cal. 1980); In re Beaver, 2 B.R. 337 (S.D. Cal. 1980).
'2 In re Coleman, 5 B.R. 812 (W.D. Ky. 1980). Reported is the district court
affirmation of Judge Deitz' bankruptcy court decision denying confirmation to a plan
paying $1.00 each to unsecured creditors.
113 In re Heard, No. 38000966 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 7, 1980).
1'3 Id. slip op. at 1 (emphasis added).
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Bankruptcy Code requirement of meaningful or substantial
repayment to creditors. '13 5 Obviously, the Western District of
Kentucky has adopted the Iacovoni position.
It is unfortunate that no opinions on the good faith issue
have thus far been reported from the Eastern District of Ken-
tucky, that being the district of Judge Joe Lee, who played a
major role in drafting the new Bankruptcy Code.138 There is,
however, some slight evidence suggesting that the Eastern
District of Kentucky will be far less willing to reject zero or
nominal payment plans on good faith grounds. In his widely
quoted article, Chapter 13 nee Chapter XIII,1 37 Judge Lee
stated:
The provisions of chapter 13 with respect to confirma-
tion of a plan would be altered drastically by S.658, the so-
called Technical Amendments bill, recently passed by the
U.S. Senate.
The proposed amendment is compulsory in nature and
appears to be contrary to the concept that repayment of
debts under chapter 13 should remain entirely voluntaryY'3s
Logically, a "best effort" requirement such as originally
proposed in the Technical Amendments Bill and addressed by
Judge Lee would alter the voluntary aspect of Chapter 13. As
it now stands, the debtor controls to a large degree the
amount of indebtedness to be repaid under the plan; to the
extent the debtor is required by a "best effort" test to pay
more than originally proposed, the amount of additional pay-
ment required is extracted involuntarily and is, in Judge Lee's
words, "contrary to the concept" of Chapter 13.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether the good faith requirement of 11
U.S.C. section 1325(a)(3) prohibits the confirmation of zero or
135 Id.
"3 Indeed, neither of the principal jurists involved in drafting the Bankruptcy
Code, Judge Lee and Judge Conrad Cyr of Maine, have reported decisions on this
issue.
137 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303 (1979).
"3 Id. at 321.
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nominal payment plans offered by debtors seeking relief
under Chapter 13 has been fully examined. Solid arguments
exist on both sides of this issue, and bankruptcy courts have
split accordingly. The majority of courts that have decided
the issue have refused to confirm zero or nominal payment
plans because those plans are deemed to lack good faith. Ex-
ceptions have been made by some of these courts for debtors
in unusually difficult circumstances who have given their
"best effort," but far more frequently these debtors have been
advised to seek relief in Chapter 7. In contrast, a minority of
bankruptcy courts, bothered by what they view as "judicial
legislation," have indicated a willingness to confirm zero or
nominal payment plans under Chapter 13 so long as debtors
are not using that Chapter in an attempt to defraud their
creditors. Though a "best effort" may not be technically re-
quired by such courts, it appears that a debtor's position
greatly improves when such a showing is made.
Kentucky's bankruptcy courts may well be divided on the
confirmation issue, though this is somewhat uncertain. The
Western District of Kentucky follows the majority position,
but it will be necessary to await the reporting of decisions
from the Eastern District of Kentucky to fully assess its pos-
ture on this issue. Nonetheless, it is anticipated that the East-
ern District of Kentucky will be a far friendlier environment
for the debtor seeking to propose a zero or nominal payment
plan under Chapter 13.
The author's own view is that the majority position is the
better reasoned one, particularly when coupled with "best ef-
fort" overtones. The wisdom of the majority position springs
not simply from the fact that a greater number of arguments
exist to support it, nor solely from the fact that those argu-
ments are more convincing. Its superiority is rooted in the re-
ality that anything which keeps the cost of credit down works
to the benefit of debtors, the very class upon which so much
congressional concern has been expended. Debtors do not
compete with creditors for the available credit supply; they
compete with other debtors. Thus, every debtor who is
granted confirmation of a zero or nominal payment plan
which is in truth less than that debtor's best effort is being
1980-81]
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allowed to transfer unnecessarily that portion of his or her ob-
ligation to other debtors through increased borrowing rates.
This deficiency is not cured by the fact that the debtor could
have filed under Chapter 7 since: 1) the Chapter 7 nondis-
chargeability provisions will, where applicable, require pay-
ment of these debts; 2) the Chapter 7 "stigma," which Chap-
ter 13 was intended to erase, will make future creditors more
cautious, and; 3) the time limitations on discharge will pre-
vent the debtor from utilizing Chapter 7 more than once every
seven years. Moreover, past abuses by creditors such as cross-
collateralization and "psychological" security interests in
household goods139 have been addressed by other sections of
the new Bankruptcy Code. 140 Thus, the need to protect debt-
ors from overreaching creditors by approval of zero or nomi-
nal payment plans does not exist.
By withholding approval of zero payment plans, the ma-
jority position judiciously guards the interests of other debt-
ors. Debtors are all in the credit boat together, and the major-
ity position wisely recognizes that there is a decided difference
between a fresh start and a free ride.
Steven F. Brines
129 See generally Comment, supra note 13, at 846-50.
"10 Among these are 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f) (Supp. III 1979), which provides for the
avoidance of nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in household
goods and related items of personal property, and the automatic stay provisions of 11
U.S.C. § 1301 (Supp. III 1979). For ultimate use of the automatic stay, see In re
Caldwell, 5 B.R. 740 (W.D. Va. 1980), in which the court stayed a criminal warrant on
the grounds that it was actually being used as a collection device outside of the plan.
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